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Abstract
When considering engaging in conict to secure control of a resource, a group needs to predict
the amount of post-conict leakage due to inltration by members of losing groups. We use
this insight to explain why conict often takes place along ethnic lines, why some ethnic
groups are more often in conict than others (and some never are), and why the same groups
are sometimes in conict and sometimes at peace . In our theory ethnic markers help enforce
group membership: in homogeneous societies members of the losing group can more easily
pass themselves as members of the winning group, and this reduces the chances of conict
as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social,
political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conict, the distance among ethnic
groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources. One of the insights is that
the incidence of ethnic conict is non-monotonic in expropriable resources as a fraction of
total resources, with a low incidence for either low or high values. We use the models
predictions to interpret historical examples of conict associated with skin pigmentation,
body size, language, and religion.
1 Introduction
Each society is endowed with a set of wealth-creating assets, such as land and mineral re-
sources, or wealth-redistributing assets, such as control of the state. There is therefore an
incentive for a subset of agents to form a group to wrest control of these assets from the
rest of the population, so as tho share the pieamong fewer claimants. Once a group has
won control over the countrys riches, however, it faces the task of enforcing the exclusion of
non-members. Agents not belonging to the winning group will attempt to inltrate it, so as
to participate in the distribution of the spoils. For example, they will apply for land titles,
mining concessions, scarce places in higher education, or for government jobs. This inltra-
tion defeats the winning groups purpose, as it dilutes the dividendeach original member
receives. In large communities of millions of citizens it can be quite costly to keep track of
the genuine members so as to successfully discriminate against the non-members. The costs
of ex-post enforcement may help explain why some societies manage to avoid conict and
enjoy broad-based participation in the nations wealth.
Conversely, distributive conict and discrimination should be more likely when it is
possible to form groups along lines that facilitate the ex-post policing of group borders, so
as to minimize leakage. One such set of circumstances may arise in societies with multiple
ethnic groups. When groups can be formed along ethnic lines, ethnic identity can be used as
a marker to recognize potential inltrators. By lowering the cost of enforcing membership in
the winning group, ethnic diversity makes the latter less susceptible to ex-post inltration by
members of the losing one. Hence, for a group that expects to prevail in a conict, a bid for
a countrys resources is an ex-ante more protable proposition if this bid occurs along ethnic
lines than if it occurs along non-ethnic (and therefore more porous) lines.
Ethnic discrimination, exploitation, and conict are frequently in the news, and perva-
sive throughout history. In many countries ethnic groups are or have been visiting violence on
each other, sometimes on a horric scale (the word genocide,by denition, refers to a type
of ethnic conict). Fearon and Laitin (2003) identify no less than 58 ethnic civil wars between
1945 and 1999, constituting 51% of the total number of civil wars.1 Less visible and news-
worthy, but quite possibly much more pervasive, is non-violent ethnic conict. Non-violent
ethnic conict can take multiple forms. In some countries ethnic groups compete through
overtly ethnic parties, vying for power. Even more often a dominant group discriminates
against and exploits the others. As Esman (1994) succinctly puts it when an ethnic group
gains control of the state, important economic assets are soon transferred to the members
of that community (p. 229). By suggesting that ethnicity helps enforcing the dominants
1Of the remaining 56 civil wars an additional 20 is classied as ambiguous,in the sense that Fearon and
Laitin are not sure whether it was faught along ethnic lines or not (their denition of ethnicwar).
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group monopoly of the countrys assets, we hope to help explain these observations.
Yet, and crucially, ethnic conict is by no means universal in ethnically heterogenous
societies: in many countries ethnic groups coexist peacefully. Nor is it constant over time:
many ethnically heterogenous societies experience long (sometimes very long) periods of
fairly harmonious ethnic relations before or after periods of conict. Why do some countries
experience ethnic conict and others dont? Why does ethnic conict wax and wane over
time in the same country?
An implication of our conception of ethnicity as a boundary-enforcement device, is
that not all ethnic distinctions are equally e¤ective ways of enforcing group membership. In
particular, it is possible that some types of ethnic identities are harder to shed than others.
One reason for this is that some ethnic identities are more easily observed by members of
other groups. The clearest case of this is the case of skin color, or other physical character-
istics that di¤er markedly among ethnic groups. Ceteris paribus ethnic boundaries based on
physical di¤erences should be easier to police than boundaries based on non-visible di¤er-
ences. Another reason why not all ethnic cleavages are equally resistant to passing is that the
psychic costs of giving up ones ethnic identity may vary with the nature of that identity. For
example, in some cases passing from one group to the other may require religious conversion,
while in others both origin and destination groups have the same religion. Abandoning ones
religious identity may be more costly psychologically than abandoning other traits of ones
cultural identity. Furthermore some religions create physical markers, such as circumcision
or scarring, that further increase the cost of passing.2
To capture this heterogeneity, we build on the notion of ethnic distance.3 In our
model ethnic distance is the cost to be born by a member of one group to successfully
pass himself as a member of the other group. In general, we would expect ethnic distance
to be maximal when there are di¤erences in skin color and other physical characteristics
that make passing all but impossible. Distance may be fairly high in the case of religious
di¤erences among groups. Language barriers could plausibly be argued to be a somewhat
weaker source of distance. Potential inltrators can assimilate through learning the language,
or more realistically through having ones children do so. Finally, ethnic cleavages that are
only marked by a shared sense of identity or history, unsupported by additional di¤erences
2Maimonides in the late 12th century explains the practice of circumcision as a way of preventing
strangers from saying they are members of the faith. For sometimes people say so for the purpose of
obtaining some advantage. Needless to say the practice has backred when circumcision has been used to
identify Jews for the purposes of persecution, as depicted most memorably in Luis Malles Au Revoir les
Enfants (1987).
3A notion of group distance is also important in Esteban and Rays (1994, 1999) measures of polarization
and their subsequent work on ethnic conict (reviewed below). However in their context distance is best
interpreted as distance in preference or income space, not in terms of ease of migration among groups.
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of color, religion, language, or other observable characteristics, should be associated with the
lowest levels of ethnic distance.4
We begin by formalizing our concept of ethnic distance, and deriving its implications
for ethnic relations, in a model of exploitation/discrimination. In this model a dominant
group decides whether or not to appropriate societys resources at the expense of a weaker
group. Members of the weaker group can only respond by passinginto the dominant group,
so ethnic relations are either peaceful or characterized by exploitation. We then extend the
model to also allow for the weaker group to collectively ght back.In this extended model
there are three possible outcomes: peace, exploitation, and open conict.
In both models the peaceful outcome is supported by low levels of ethnic distance.
The further the distance, the most limited the passing from the losing/exploited group into
the winning/dominant group, and hence the greater the reward from conict behavior for
the latter. It also turns out that the peaceful outcome fails to prevail for intermediate levels
of expropriable assets resources that can be captured through exploitation/conict as a
share of overall income. In our model an increase in the share of expropriable assets has two
opposing e¤ects on the incentive to engage in appropriation. It increases the prize to be
gained by the dominant group, and hence its incentive to seek conict. But it also increases
the incentive for the losers to pass into the dominant group, enhancing the dilution e¤ect from
inltration, and thus reducing the incentive for appropriation by the prospective dominant
group. Hence, exploitation and conict prevail for intermediate levels of the expropriable-
resource share in total wealth. The two models have further comparative-statics predictions
with respect to the inter-group distribution of wealth, the pre-conict relative size of the
groups, and the destructiveness of conict, which we discuss in detail after characterizing the
equilibrium.
Given these results, cross-country di¤erences in proneness to exploitation and conict
would result from di¤erences in all the determinants just listed, and transitions from one
form of ethnic relations to another would equally be driven by changes over time in these
determinants. Particularly likely seem changes in the share of expropriable assets in total
wealth, and we discuss below a number of historical examples where we conjecture such
changes may have led to long-run changes in ethnic relations. Changes in ethnic distance due
to changes in the perceived psychic costs of passing seem also possible, and so are of course
changes in the relative wealth of the groups, changes in relative group size (for example due
to migration or di¤erential population growth), and of course changes in conict technology
that may make conict more or less destructive.
4Needless to say, ethnic boundaries can be and often are multi-dimensional, involving various combinations
of physical, religious, linguistic, and other cultural di¤erences. Ethnic distance is the cumulative e¤ect of these
di¤erences.
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Another source of distance is of course geography. Our model applies equally well to
groups that form based on the geographical base of their membership. When one groups army
enters a city in enemy territory, its soldiers can be pretty condent that the overwhelming
majority of the civilians they encounter belong to the enemy group. Hence, our theory of
conict among geographically separated groups is isomorphic to our theory of ethnically
distant groups, and one may therefore be able to use our model, together with other relevant
state variables identied in this paper, to explain changes over time in the intensity of inter-
regional (and perhaps even international) conict.
It is important to stress that we are not arguing that conict will only arise in societies
with deep ethnic divides. If the benets of conict are large enough, a group aiming to exclude
the rest of the population may arise even in relatively homogenous societies: this group will
tolerate a certain amount of leakage and/or will be willing to pay relatively large costs to set
up articial methods to enforce membership (e.g. party a¢ liation). We are merely saying
that, ceteris paribus, distance increases the likelihood for conict, particularly if the other
conditions listed in the text are satised.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review related
theoretical literature on the causes of ethnic conict, as well as the nature of ethnicity and
ethnic identity. Section 3 presents our model of exploitation, and 4 presents the richer model
where appropriation behavior can results either in exploitation or in open conict. Section 5
goes back to the literature: it looks at studies that provide empirical and historical under-
pinnings to our key notion of ethnic distance, and how it relates to passingbetween ethnic
groups. It also relates the model to existing empirical evidence on ethnic conict. Finally,
we discuss how our model can contribute to the understanding of a number of historical
examples that we think our theory sheds some light on, including Black-White relations in
the United States and South Africa; Hutu-Tutsi relations in Rwanda and Burundi; Muslims
and Hindus in India; and others.
2 Related Literature
The paper contributes to the literature, too vast to survey here, on distributive conict
among social groups. Much of this literature begins with a partition of society into groups
(variously identied by social classes, ideology, ethnicity, etc.) and then proceeds to study
why, when, and how intensively a distributional conict will take place. Our contribution to
this literature is to highlight concerns with ex-post inltration as a potential deterrent for
conict. This focus allows us not only to generate new insights on when two or more social
groups will enter into conict, but also to shed light on which types of social cleavages are
more likely to be associated with conict. In particular, ceteris paribus conict should be
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more prevalent when passing from one group to the other is more di¢ cult. One cleavage that
is often di¢ cult to cross is the one between ethnic groups. Hence, we can use our insight as a
basis for an explanation for why social conict appears to be so frequently along ethnic lines.
The rest of this section discusses (selectively, for lack of space) other attempts to answer the
same question.
Our interpretation of ethnic conict belongs to the instrumentalisttradition most
often associated with Bates (1974, 1982). Bates foremost point is that ethnic conict is
conict among rational agents over scarce resources. He buttresses this claim by organizing
an astounding wealth of case-studies from Sub-Saharan Africa. Many subsequent scholars
have identied numerous further examples where leaders favor their own ethnicity when
allocating resources [see e.g. Posner (2005) for Africa.] Taking Batesview of the reasons for
conict as our starting point, we formalize the reasons why ethnicity is a rational basis for
coalition building and provide a characterization of some of the conditions that make ethnic
conict more likely.
Within the rich political-science instrumentalist literature on ethnic conict two sig-
nicant antecedents are Chandra (2004) and Fearon (1999). Chandra argues that voters
nd collecting information on candidatesbackground and intentions costly, while ethnicity
is readily observable. Hence, they use ethnicity as a noisy but low-cost signal of candidates
propensity to favor them in allocating public goods and transfers. Given this behavior by
voters, it can be rational for parties to organize along ethnic lines. There is some connection
between Chandras use of ethnicity as a low-cost signal of intentions and our use of ethnic-
ity as a low-cost technology to police coalition boundaries, and our analyses are somewhat
complementary. The closest antecedent to our work, however, is Fearon (1999), who asks
why ethnic politics and porkpolitics often tend to go together, and conjectures informally
that allocating pork according to ethnicity (or other features that are not easily chosen or
changed by individuals) is a way of preventing political losers from attempting to enter the
winning group.
In economics there is a growing literature of formal models of social and international
conict. A subset of this literature focuses (or can be interpreted as focusing) on ethnic
conict. Robinson (2001) and Esteban and Ray (2008) study societies with both class and
ethnic cleavages and ask when one should expect to see ethnic as opposed to class conict (or
no conict). Esteban and Ray (2011) focus on the role of within- and between-group income
di¤erences in determining conict intensity. Esteban and Ray (forthcoming) investigate the
relation between the intensity of conict and various measures of heterogeneity used in the
empirical literature. Padró i Miquel (2007) focuses on autocratsexploitation of ethnic fears
in order to extract rents while imposing severe distortions on the economy. Rohner (2010)
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and Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011a) model the two-way interaction between conict
and trust.
In all these studies the division of society into groups is xed and immutable. Further-
more, ethnicity is an entirely arbitrary labelling of individuals with no clear economic role.
The distinctive feature of our model is that it is based on a concrete economic interpretation
of ethnicity: it provides a (possible) marker for policing group boundaries. Several distinctive
novel insights derive from having taken this stand. First, the general insight that concerns
with ex-post inltration may be a potentially important deterrent for conict. Second, that
not all ethnic cleavages are equally likely to lead to conict (while the current literature is
silent on this kind of heterogeneity). Third, that the ethnic composition of a country is en-
dogenous to conict. Fourth, that the relationship between resource-endowments and conict
is non-monotonic.5
The paper also contributes to the literature on the construction and salience of eth-
nicity. Two closely-related propositions enjoy near-universal consensus in this literature. The
rst proposition is that ethnicitys saliencechanges over time, both within the lifetime of
individuals and in terms of wider societal perceptions. In other words individuals and com-
munities ascribe to ethnic identities more importance in certain periods than in others (and
sometimes no importance at all). This view is entirely consistent with our framework. Indeed,
our model o¤ers an explanation for why ethnicitys salience varies across time and space. In
the model periods of harmonious relations may be interpreted as periods where ethnicity is
not salient, while periods where conict or exploitation take place are periods where ethnic-
ity has become salient. As discussed, such transitions from non-salience to salience can be
triggered by changes in macro-economic conditions, changes in the wealth status of certain
groups, or changes in the perceived social cost of conict.
The second widely held view is that ethnic identity is a social construct,in the sense
that it results from social discoursesthat end up conditioning individuals to identify with
particular groups. This idea seems implicit in Barth (1969) and has been extensively elabo-
rated. A famous application is in Anderson (1983). Social constructivism is in opposition to
an alternative approach that views ethnic identity as an immutable feature of human nature.6
Once again our contribution is fully consistent with the social-constructivist position. In our
framework, like in much instrumentalist writing on ethnic conict, ethnic groups are socially
constructed to build winning coalitions.7 Our twist on social constructionism is to point out
5Berman (2000, 2009), and Berman and Laitin (2008) model mechanisms leading to group identity and
cohesion. While the context is radical religious groups, these contributions share with ours a focus on the
policing of group boundaries.
6See Fearon and Laitin (2000) for an excellent discussion of the relation between social constructivist views
of ethnicity and theories of ethnic conict.
7Harris and Sim (2002) say ... advocates of this social constructionist perspective on race maintain that
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that such discourses are easier to make where there exist markers (of color, or language, or
religion, etc.) around which the discourses can be organized. In other words it is easier to
create a social construction of identity when this identity can be pegged on the hook of, say,
skin color than when such a hook is absent.8
3 A Model of Exploitation
3.1 Assumptions
We study a society populated by a continuum of individuals of measure 1. Each individual is
initially assigned to one of two groups, A or B.9 The initial size of group A is n (so the initial
size of B is 1 n). Within each group, all individuals are identical. Each member of group A
(B) has an initial exogenous income stream yA (yB) from assets that cannot be expropriated.
One may loosely think of yA as human capital. In addition, society is endowed with aggregate
resources that generate an income stream of z, that must somehow be distributed among the
population. z could be the rental value of land, mineral resources, or any other endowment
that is valuable to a country.
We will assume that one of the two groups is strongerand can set up an exploitation
regime. We have in mind that one of the two groups has greater re power and can largely
impose its will. In many cases the stronger group will be the numerical majority. However,
in some cases minorities may be stronger if they can mobilize greater resources per capita,
or equivalently have greater human capital (e.g. South Africa during Apartheid). Without
the function of race is to reinforce and perpetuate social di¤erences.
8 In this respect our approach shares some features with van den Berghes (1978, 1981, 1995) theory of
ethnic identication and racism. Building on evolutionary psychology, Van den Berghe argues that agents
are strongly motivated by nepotism,an evolutionary-driven tendency to seek to benet individuals who are
more likely to share a larger proportion of ones genotypes. This induces agents to look for cues that can
provide some information on common ancestry, such as skin color and visible physical features (leading to
racism) or cultural markers (leading to ethnic identication). Like us, van den Berghe stresses the gradient
among possible markers of ancestry: where physical, genetic markers do a reliable job of di¤erentiating
between groups they are used, but most ethnic groups look so much like their neighbors that they must
rely on cultural markers of distinction (1995, p. 361). He then goes on to discuss the relative e¤ectiveness
of dress, cultural markers which permanently change physical appearance (such as scarication), language,
etc. The di¤erence between van den Berghe and us is that we do not require nepotism for agents to be
interested in identifying markers that lower the cost of policing group boundaries - our agents are purely
selsh. Furthermore, van den Berghes analysis does not directly address uctuations over time in the salience
of racial and ethnic identities.
9 It is conceptually straightforward to extend the model to the case of more than two groups, though it
becomes di¢ cult to obtain closed-form results. The multiple-group extension is discussed in Unpublished
Appendix 3.
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loss of generality we assume that A is the stronger group.10
Group A then chooses between two actions: C (for conict) or P (for peace). We
dont model the specic mechanism through which this collective decision is taken, but we
assume that the choice maximizes the utility of agents who start out as members of group
A.11 If group A chooses C, it takes hold of the common resource z, to the exclusion of
the members of the other group from enjoyment in it. Exploitation is costly. If group A
decides to seize control, a fraction  of all the countrys resources is lost. There are several
possible interpretations of the cost . It could represent the cost of the repressive apparatus
needed to enforce the exploitation of group B. It can also represent the deadweight cost of
discrimination. For example, exploitation may call for excluding talented members of group
B from administrative and managerial posts (and having to search further down the talent
distribution of group A to replace them). Net of this cost, conict results in a reallocation of
the common resource z to group A, with the ex-post (i.e. end-of-game) members of the group
sharing equally in it. If group A chooses action P , z is divided equally among all citizens.1213
Group As conict or peace decision takes up the rst stage of the game. In the second
stage, members of the weaker group decide whether to keep their identity, or to passand
join the majority.14 Passing is individually costly. Consider, for example, the case where
groups A and B correspond to di¤erent ethnicities. At the simplest level, changing ethnic
group may involve considerable loss of ethnicity-specic human capital. For example, one
may have to sacrice business contacts, or leave a profession that has an ethnic connotation
to it. Changing identity will almost invariably also involve geographical relocation to an
10We could formalize the denition of stronger by saying, for example, that group A is stronger if its
aggregate wealth is greater, i.e. yAn > yB(1   n), but since the formal denition of strongerplays no role
in the subsequent analysis we leave other possibilities open.
11Because all of the members of group A are identical, almost all rules to aggregate preferences will give rise
to the same decision as of whether to exploit or not to exploit group B, as long as the spoils are shared equally
among group As members. In turn, the equal-sharing option would be the natural choice on a behind the
veil of ignorancebasis.
12 In Unpublished Appendix 2 we relax the assumption of within-group equal sharing to allow for a distinction
between leaders and followers, where leaders enjoy a disproportionate share of the rewards from conict. Our
results are robust to this modication.
13There is here, and even more clearly in the extension of Section (4), where we look at the possibility
of Group B ghitng back, an implicit assumption that groups cannot precommit to act cooperatively. In
the present context, group B could agree to cooperate to its own exploitation (saving the economy the cost
) while still allowing A to take all of the pie. We implicitly assume that if A lets down its guard, say by
eschewing a repressive apparatus or by allowing talented members of groups B to take on important jobs (but
none of the benets) group B will then have an incentive to renege and try to keep some of z for itself.
14 It will be obvious below that members of the stronger group never pass in this simple version of the
model. In the richer model of Section 4, where group B can ght back, or even attempt to exploit group
A, members of group A may also wish to pass.
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area where ones ancestry is not known, with attendant further loss of business contacts
or location-specic human capital. It may also involve some kind of primitive surgery, the
payment of bribes to counterfeit identication documents or change names, payments to
families of other groups in order to marry (ones children) into them, etc. Finally, there are
the obvious, and often very large, psychic costs associated with the loss of ones social and
cultural identity.
It seems plausible to assume that passing costs have both an additive component and
a component proportional to income. For example the losses of ethnic- or location-specic
human capital or the need to re sell assets in the process of relocation are likely to be
proportional. The suppliers of surgery or fake documents may also have private information
on wealth, and demand a proportional payment. On the other hand, psychic costs are
probably less dependent on income, and hence better captured by an additive term. Overall,
then, the cost of passing from B to A might be modelled as 0 + yB, with  and 0
both parameters capturing the additive and proportional component of the passing cost,
respectively. As it turns out, none of the qualitative results are a¤ected by the inclusion of
the additive term, so we will set 0 = 0 in the remainder of the paper.15
A key idea is that the passing cost  will depend on the nature of the criterion by
which agents are classied as members of A or B. If the two groups are perfectly identical in
average characteristics, we when the labels A and B are randomly assigned, or the population
itself is perfectly homogenous, then passing should be costless, or  = 0. On the other hand
ethnic identities are often harder to shed than other types of social labels, or categories, as
the technical di¢ culty of passing (e.g. skin color), or the psychic costs (e.g. religion), are
greater. Hence, on average societies that are characterized by ethnic distinctions will have
higher  parameters than ethically homogenous societies. Ethnically homogenous societies
may have other types of potential groupings, e.g. by ideology, but such alternative partitions
will tend to feature a lower .
Even so, this does not mean that all ethnically diverse societies will have the same
, as  will depend on the nature of the ethnic distinction (race, religion, skin color, etc.).
For example, it is clearly more costly for a person with very dark skin to pass himself o¤ as
white (impossible) than for a low-caste Hindu to become Catholic (painful, perhaps, but fea-
sible). We therefore assume that  can vary continuously from zero (to capture a completely
homogenous country) to innity.
15The converse is not true: in the special case of  = 0 we would lose the result, derived below, that an
increase in yA can trigger a transition from peace to exploitaton. While this is not the most distinctive new
result of the paper, it is still interesting and, as discussed, we do believe that passing costs have a proportional
component. This is why we focus on the 0 = 0 case and not on the  = 0 case.
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Identity switchers cannot be separately identied from original members of the group.16
The number of ex-post members of group A is denoted n0, and is equal to n plus the number
of initial members of group B who switched identity. After individuals have made (and exe-
cuted) their ethnic identity decision, resources are allocated based. Individuals derive utility
exclusively from consumption, and consumption equals income.
Society can be characterized by the initial relative group-size n, non-expropriable
endowments yA and yB, aggregate resources z, switching cost , and exploitation-cost para-
meter . Given these characteristics, group A decides collectively whether or not to engage
in conict, and individuals of group B choose their ethnic identity, giving rise to n0.
3.2 Equilibrium
Consider the rst-stage decision by group A whether or not to exploit group B. If A decides
for peace (action P ) its per-capita payo¤ is simply
UPA = yA + z: (1)
I.e., members of group A have complete access to their initial endowment, as well as to the
common resource z, which is divided equally among all members of society. If instead, they
decide to seize control of z (action C) their payo¤ is
UCA = (1  )

yA +
z
n0

: (2)
Hence, exploitation leads to the loss of yA units of the individual endowment as well as
z units of the collective good. On the other hand, through action C group A obtains full
control of the natural resource. This amount is divided equally among the nal membership
of group A, n0.
It is clear by comparing the last two expressions that group As decision as to whether
or not to play C depends on the equilibrium response of n0 if it does so: the greater the
expected ex-post size of group A in the event of a conict, the less likely group A is to
seek it. For example, it is immediately apparent that there will be no equilibria where a
C action induces all of the members of group B to switch identity: with n0 = 1 we have
UCA = (1  ) [yA + z], which is certainly less than UPA : More generally, by comparing eqs. (2)
and (1), we see that group A will seek to exploit group B if and only if n0 < ~n, where
~n  (1  )z
yA + z
:
16We are implicitly assuming the individual income is private information. This assumption seems fairly
realistic for most settings. This assumption would not be needed in a model with heterogeneity in within-
group incomes. However such an assumption introduces potential within-group conicts of interest that would
distract from the main focus of this paper.
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This exploitation thresholdis increasing in z, falling in the cost of exploitation , and falling
in the income of the victorious group yA: the richer group A is, the more it is concerned about
the destructive e¤ects of exploitation. Note that ~n < 1.
In case A plays C each member of group B decides his ethnic identity.17 If he passes
to group A he receives utility
USB = (1  )
h
(1  )yB + z
n0
i
;
where the rst term in the square bracket reects the cost of changing identity and the
second term is the gain represented by access to resources seized by group A. Since there is
exploitation all resources are net of the cost . If he sticks to his original identity his utility
is
UNSB = (1  )yB:
The pro of passing is that it allows the passer to retain access to the common resource. The
con is that one has to pay the switching cost.
Note that the gain from switching is decreasing in n0. For low values of n0 the gains
from defecting are relatively large, as the spoils of exploitation are divided among few people.
As n0 increases an inltrators share falls, and so does the incentive to pass. Hence, passing by
some reduces the incentive for further passing by others. Indeed, for n0 large enough gaining
access to z is not a su¢ cient compensation for the switching cost, and the net incentive to
pass may become negative. In particular, we have that members of group B pass as long as
n0 < n, where
n  z
yB
:
The switching thresholdn is increasing in the spoils of conict z (the bigger the pie, the
larger the number of people one is willing to share it with), and decreasing in the cost of
switching yB. Note that it is possible for n to be larger than 1. These are cases in which,
under exploitation, members of the weak group have an incentive to defect at all values of n0
(the pie to share is just too large relative to the cost of changing sides).
The equilibrium value of n0 when A plays C depends on the relative positions of the
initial group size n and the switching threshold n. If n < n, and exploitation occurs, citizens
of group B will start switching to A. If n < 1 the ow of defectors will stop when no further
incentives to switching are left, i.e. the equilibrium value of n0 is n. If n > 1 the ow of
defectors will stop when all members of group B have switched sides, i.e. n0 = 1. On the
other hand, if n > n there are already too many people in group A to start with, and
17 It should be obvious that there is no switching by members of group B if there is no conict (they would
pay the switching cost, but gain nothing).
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no member of group B wishes to switch. The equilibrium in this case features n0 = n. In
summary, if the dominant group A seeks to exploit group B; we have n0 = max [n;min(1; n)].
Recall now that group A seeks to exploit group B if it does not expect too much
switching in response, i.e. if n0 < ~n, where ~n is the exploitation threshold.We therefore
have exploitation if max [n;min(1; n)] < ~n. Recall also that ~n < 1 (A never plays C when
everyone switches to A), so there can never be exploitation if n  1. This allows us to simplify
the condition for exploitation to
max (n; n) < ~n: (3)
We summarize this discussion with the following
Proposition: Group A exploits group B if and only if (3) holds. If, furthermore,
n < n, then there is switching from B to A, and n0 = n. Otherwise n0 = n.
If n < n < ~n, then there is exploitation, and the equilibrium value of n0 is n. The
size of the dominant group is su¢ ciently small that members of group B switch, but not in
large enough numbers to make action C unprotable for the dominant group. For n < n < ~n
there is still exploitation, but no switching. The exclusionary benets of appropriating z are
large enough for the dominant group to play C, but not large enough for members of the
weak group to incur the switching cost . For n > ~n it is never worth it for the dominant
group to exploit the small minority in B. Finally, if n < ~nA < n, group A would benet from
taking control of z if its ex-post size was the same as its ex-ante one, but it expects too much
switching in equilibrium, so it does not attempt it.
3.3 Comparative Statics
Depending on the conguration of parameters ; ; n; z; yA; and yB; a country will or will not
experience an ethnic conict. We want to know how the exploitationv. no exploitation
status changes as these 6 parameters vary. Substituting the expressions for n and ~n in (3)
we easily get that exploitation occurs if and only if (i) n < (1  ) and, (ii)
yAn
(1  )  n < z < (1  )yB   yA: (4)
The comparative static properties of the model follow immediately from (4). The following
describes the region of the parameter space where exploitation occurs: relatively high values
of the passing cost ; intermediate values of the resource-rent ow z; relatively low values of
the income of the stronger group A, and, relatively high values of the income of the weaker
group B; relatively small relative sizes of the dominant group A; small sizes of the cost of
conict .
It is also of interest to ask which parameters are associated with more passing in case
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of exploitation. Since passing occurs when n > n, or
z
yB
> n;
more passing (conditional on exploitation) is associated with smaller , yB and n, and with
larger z.
We further illustrate and discuss our results with the help of Figure 1, which measures
z on the horizontal axis, and  on the vertical axis. The gure features a large triangle denoted
conict.This is the set of (z; ) combinations that satisfy condition (4), and hence give
rise to exploitation of B by A (holding constant the other parameters). Outside of this
triangle A does not attempt to gain control. The conictregion is further divided into two
triangles. The no switchtriangle corresponds to combinations of parameters such that all
the members of group B stay in group B, while the switchtriangle features some switching
from B to A.
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Figure 1: Exploitation v. peace as functions of z and 
The gure shows a (weakly) positive relationship between exploitation and distance,
. For given z=y, there is no exploitation if  is very low, and there is exploitation if  is
high enough. Hence, proximity acts as a deterrent to conict: the dominant group eschews
any attempts at exploitation when it expects a large inow of group B members should it
try to do so. A low  allows for such a massive switching.
The gure also shows an inverted-U shapedrelationship between z=y and exploita-
tion. Moving from left to right for a given (su¢ ciently high) value of , we see that there
is no exploitation for z low - it does not pay. However, exploitation also disappears as an
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equilibrium for z large. The reason is that the larger is z the larger is the number of B
members who switch to A grabs z. Anticipating this massive switching, group A backs o¤.
Hence, A exploits B only if z is large enough to make for an appealing booty, but not so
large that it triggers a massive switching from B to A. However, the existence of a switch
sub-region in the conict region shows that A can tolerate a moderate amount of inltration
and still pursue exploitation.
Figure 1 also highlights the interaction between ethnic distance  and abundance of
resources z. In particular, the greater the ethnic distance the larger the set of values of z such
that exploitation occurs. The intuition is immediate from the previous discussion: the more
costly it is to switch, the smaller the elasticity with respect to z of inter-group migration in
response to conict. Hence, the greater the ethnic distance, the more aggressive group A can
be in appropriating large amounts of riches.
Finally, the gure shows that, not surprisingly given the discussion above, switching
occurs for relatively low  and relatively high z, with a similar interaction between these
variables as found in the decision of A.
Changes in group incomes can also be illustrated with reference to Figure 1. An
increase in yA causes the vertical line to shift right and the diagonal line to shift left, shrinking
the conict region. As group A becomes richer (relative to the resource endowment) we move
from exploitation to peace. This is the standard insight that the stronger group is more
interested in conict when the resources at stake are abundant, relative to the cost of conict
(which is indexed by the groups human capital). An increase in yB causes the diagonal
line to rotate clockwise, thereby expanding the conict region. The reason for this is more
specic to our model. Since (some) passing costs are proportional to income, high income
agents have more to lose from switching identity. Hence, exploitation is more likely when the
stronger group has low per-capita income and the weaker group has high per-capita income
(always relative to the resource endowment).
An increase in the dominant-group size n shifts the vertical line in Figure 1 to the
right, so that the conict region shrinks. In particular, there are now fewer values of  and
fewer values of z=y for which exploitation occurs. A larger initial size of the stronger group
implies a smaller per-capita gain in the amount of natural resources appropriated through
action C, and hence a smaller incentive. Indeed, as per condition (i) above, there always
are values of n that are large enough that no conict occurs (the conict region disappears).
This particular result will receive some qualication in Section 4, when we allow group B to
ght back.
Increases in  have very similar e¤ects as declines in . Increases in  tend to reduce
the set of other parameter values such that there A plays C (the conictarea with a larger
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 is always a subset of the area with a smaller ). For  large enough we are always in the
peace region. Indeed, there is always a neighborhood of  = 1 such that exploitation does
not take place, irrespective of other parametersvalues.
3.4 Summing Up
In sum, if group A is the stronger group, we are more likely to observe exploitation of group B
by group A if: (i) The ethnic distance between A and B is large; (ii) the countrys endowment
of expropriable resources is neither too small nor too large; (iii) group B has high per-capita
income; (iv) group A has low per-capita income; (v) group A is small; and (vi) the e¢ ciency
costs of exploitation are modest.
It is very important to stress that for all variables the threshold values that trigger
exploitation are dened in terms of the other variables in the model. For example, the lower
 the lower the required threshold for . This has important empirical implications. For
example, consider the potential inverted-U shaped pattern that the theory predicts for the
e¤ect of variation in z on the peace-conict status of a country. The upper threshold is clearly
increasing in  and, indeed, if  = 1 then the relationship between z and conict status
becomes monotonic: since switching identity is prohibitively expensive, the deterrent e¤ect
of switching does not counter-balance the incentive to ght for a larger z. Hence, the model
predicts that the width of the U shape depends on the value of .
4 Exploitation v Conict
In the model of the previous section, when group A goes on the o¤ensive and decides to
appropriate the resource z; the only choice open to members of group B is whether or not
to pass themselves o¤ as members of the dominant group. The model does not distinguish
between situations in which the losers surrender, and give the winners free reign on the
countrys resources a situation we have termed exploitationand one where the losers
ght back,and try to retain control over at least some share of the countrys resources a
situation for which we now specialize the meaning of the word conict.We now turn to a
simple extension that accommodates a distinction between these two outcomes.
We continue to assume that, realistically, the stronger group, group A, moves rst,
and chooses between a conict action, C, and a peace action, P . However, we now
introduce a new second stage where group B can also respond with a C action or a P action.
Furthermore, in the third stage we now explicitly consider not only the possibility of switching
from B to A, but also from A to B.
The consequences of various series of actions are as follows. If both groups have played
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P , peace prevails, and each group i receives yi + z, i.e. their inalienableendowment yi plus
an equal stake in the countrys natural resources. This is the same as the no-exploitation
equilibrium in the previous sections model. If one of the two groups has played C, and the
other group has played P , we are in a situation where the Cplaying group is exploiting the
Pplaying group, which acquiesces. In this case, the C playing group gains control of all
the natural resources z, which are then shared among the ex-post members of this group.
Exploitation has enforcement costs and/or introduces distortions that reduce all incomes by
a fraction . This is analogous to the exploitationscenario of the previous section, except
that we leave open the possibility that group B exploits A, and not only A exploits B.
The more radically new type of scenario that is possible in this extension pertains to
the outcome when both groups play C. We now assume that in this case the stronger group,
group A, receives a fraction  of the natural resource, with  > 0:5, while the weaker group,
say B, receives the remaining (1 ): Hence, relative to acquiescing to being exploited by A,
and losing all control over z, B can ght backand retain some fraction, albeit less than its
fair share,of the countrys endowment. However, this ghting-back option comes at a cost.
We assume that open conict causes greater social losses than exploitation. The destruction
rate of output in the CC equilibrium is  > .
The extended form of the game is (partially) depicted in gure 2, where at each nal
node the payo¤ of A is listed rst and the payo¤ of B second. The interpretation of the
payo¤s is straightforward in the PP case, where peace prevails. In the cases of exploitation
(PC or CP ) the exploiting group receives its own endowment y plus z divided by the number
of ex-post group members, both depreciated at rate . The exploited groups payo¤ depends
on this groups passing behavior. Non-passers receive only their individual endowment y.
Hence if there is no passing, or if passing occurs until members of the exploited group have
become indi¤erent between switching and maintaining their identity, the payo¤ for members
of the exploited group is (1 )y. On the other hand, if all the members of the exploited group
pass over to the exploiting group, their welfare is (1  ) [(1  )y + z]. In other words they
pay the switching cost but recover access to their share of the countrys resources. Universal
passing of the group occurs when this last quantity exceeds (1   )y, which explains the
formula for the exploited groups payo¤.
The payo¤s in case CC, or open conict, also depend on switching behavior. We
show later that only members of group B switch to A, if at all. In equilibrium, members of
group B prefer to remain in their original group, or are indi¤erent between switching and not
switching. (Note that since stayers get some positive amount of the natural resource, there
is no possibility that the entire membership of the group will switch identity.) Hence, the
utility of members of group i in case CC is yi plus the per ex-post member amount of natural
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Figure 2: The 3-Stage Game
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resource that the group manages to preserve in the conict. This payo¤ is now discounted
at the higher rate .
Solving this version of the model is conceptually straightforward. For each of the
four nal nodes PP , PC, CP , and CC one needs rst to determine the equilibrium ex-post
group sizes, or n0. Given n0 one can determine whether B prefers PP or PC, and whether
it prefers CP or CC. This provides A with B0s response function to its actions. Given that,
A chooses its best option between P and C.18 The formal analysis, which is quite tedious,
can be found in the online appendix to the paper.19 Here we describe the properties of the
equilibrium and the comparative statics.
The general structure of the model of this section can best be discussed with reference
to Figure 3. In the gure we hold constant yA, yB, , n, , and , and study how the nature
of the equilibrium vary as we vary  and z. Each type of equilibrium is identied by the
nal node reached in the game between ethnic groups.20 As in the benchmark model, there
is a broadly triangular region featuring some type of conict, while the complement features
peace. Hence, peace prevails for low values of the passing costs , and for values of z that
are neither small or large, but not intermediate. We also see again the important interaction
between z and : as  increases conict occurs for a larger range of values of z.
One new feature of the equilibrium is that attempts to capture the resource z can
now result in either exploitation or open conict. In particular, there is an inner triangle
featuring open conict, CC, and outside corridorsfeaturing exploitation by A on B, CP .
Finally, between the left CP corridor and the inner CC triangle there can be a region, PC,
where B exploits A, rather than the other way around. Hence, for  su¢ ciently large, as
z increases from a su¢ ciently low value, the economy potentially transitions from peace, to
exploitation of B by A, of A by B, to open conict, back to exploitation by A, and nally
back to peace However it is important to note that not all these regions necessarily exist.
18As already discussed in footnote 13 we implicitly rule out side deals. For example, an interesting variant
of this model would give group A the option of o¤ering to group B a division of Z which is more favorable
to A than under the PP equilibrium, but not as favorable as under the CP or CC equilibrium. While
such arrangements are sometimes observed in reality, they do heavily depend on both parties being able to
make binding commitments. For example typically partial exploitation will require that the dominant group
controls all the resources, and hands out group Bs agreed share voluntarily and on an ongoing basis. It may
be very di¢ cult for B to monitor that this is appropriately done, particularly when the governments budget
accounting is murky. It also requires B to commit not to take advantage of situations in which A has lowered
its guard. In practice, inability to commit seems likley to be a frequent situation.
19The appendix studies in detail the model under the following restrictions on the parameters: (1 ) < n
and   2n n2. Exploring other regions of the parameter space would not materially change the qualitative
insights from the model.
20For example CP is the region of the parameter space where in equilibrium A plays C and B plays C: The
lables zlB;PC , z
l
B;CC , etc. are explained in the online appendix.
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Figure 3: Regions of Peace, Exploitation, and Open Conict
The only two regions that always exist (i.e. for all combinations of values of , ; , yA, yB,
and n) are PP and CC (we return to comparative statics with respect to these parameters
below).
The intuition for how ethnic relations change with z is as follows. For z very low
neither party wishes to disturb the peace, as the pie to ght over is too small. When z
is larger both A and B become interested in exploiting each other, but not yet willing to
engage in full-scale conict, as the costs of the latter are still too large compared to the
benet. Hence, it is possible for A to play C without B ghting back. As z rises further, B
begins to ght back when A plays C. Whether we enter directly the CC region, or we rst
transit through a PC region (as depicted in the gure), depends on parameter values. The
reason why there may be a PC region is that, if z is not large enough, A may prefer to be
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exploited rather than bear the very large costs of an open conict. Further increases in z
beyond the CC region can bring about a new region of exploitation of B by A. The intuition
for this region is interesting. For z large enough, the entire B population passes into group A
under exploitation, so the payo¤ of group B under exploitation becomes increasing in z. In
particular, it can exceed the payo¤ of open conict, leading the group as a whole to choose to
be exploited rather than ght back. However in the same region B would respond to P with
C, as it is attractive to exploit the other group. A is therefore faced with a choice between
being exploited or exploit, and obviously chooses the latter, even if the benet is nil. Finally,
for z very large again neither group wishes to exploit the other, as the volume of passing
(both ways) would nullify the benets.
The models comparative statics with respect to the income of the stronger group, yA,
are slightly richer than in the benchmark model of exploitation. As in that model, an increase
in yA makes group A generally more peace oriented, as it increases the cost of conict (of
any type). In particular, this results in a shift to the right of the lower bounds of both the
CP and the CC region, meaning that the onset of conict is generally for higher values of
z. However, an increase in yA also makes group A less mobile, thereby increasing the region
in which B responds to P with C. As a consequence, A is forced more often to play C to
preempt being exploited by B, resulting in shifts to the right also of the upper bounds of the
CP and the CC region, meaning that conict generally persists for higher values of z as well.
Another e¤ect is that the PC region widens. In sum, an increase in yA leads to shifts to the
right of both the inner and outer conict triangles, as well as an expansion of the inner PC
region.21
Similarly, increases in yB tend to increase the cost of conict for B, which generally
tend to shrink the CC area. The one countervailing force comes about, once again, when B
must choose between CC and a CP situation where all the members of B pass into A. Since
an increase in yB increases the cost of passing, the net e¤ect may be that B chooses CC
more often in this region. Increases in B also have the e¤ect of moving the outer edge of the
CP region inward: the reason is that the higher yB implies that B does not try to exploit
A as often. As a result, A is forced to preempt less often. Thus, contrary to the benchmark
model, increases in yB could shrink, rather than expand, the overall conict area. On the
whole, however, the insight is similar: increases in one groups income make that group less
aggressive, and the other group more aggressive.
The e¤ect of an increase in n on the overall conict area is also more ambiguous
than in the benchmark model. The main conicting forces are that: A has less to gain from
21The parameter yA, together with n, discussed below, is also the most important determinant of whether
some of the regions exist at all. In particular, for yA su¢ ciently small both the PC and the right corridor of
the CP region disappear.
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conict, which is the only force in the benchmark model, but B has now more to gain from
conict. This reects the asymmetric nature of conict: it does not depend on the average
gain from conict between the two groups, but on the maximum gain between the two groups.
The maximum gain occurs when a small minority exploits a large majority. In this case, very
low values of n tend to be associated with exploitation of B by A, and extremely large values
of n may be associated with exploitation of A by B. In between, we tend to have either
peace, or open conict. Hence, the model accommodates the frequent pattern of powerful
minorities exploiting the weaker majority (e.g. Sunnis exploiting Shias in pre-war Iraq), but
also the puzzle that sometimes what look like small and weak minorities enjoy a seemingly
privileged status. In these cases the strong majority (group A) prefers to entirely acquiesce
to group Bs voracity. Perhaps the current treatment of the surviving American-Indiansin
the US, and the Indian Tribeserce policing of their ethnic boundaries against (what they
consider to be) inltrators, may resemble this situation.
Many of the results in this sub-section highlight an important tension: the larger
the group, the greater its power, but the less its incentive to engage in exploitation. This
result may explain why the persecution of minorities is often accompanied and fueled by
accusations that the minority is conspiring against the majority. It is true that in open
conict the minority stand to obtain a relatively minor share of the countrys resources, but
it is also true that if the majority lowers its guard and opens itself to exploitation by the
minority the latter has enormous incentives to seize the opportunity.
5 Empirical Evidence and Historical Examples
The goal of this section is to discuss the empirical plausibility of our model assumptions
(briey) and predictions (at greater length). We begin in Section 5.1 with a short review
of evidence of passing behavior, as well as evidence that passing can be successful, in the
sense that passers can fool members of the receiving group. Next, in Section 5.2, we confront
our models predictions for the e¤ects of distance, resource endowments, group incomes and
group sizes with the existing empirical literature on conict. We nd some comfort in this
review, as the available evidence overall seems quite consistent with our models predictions.
However few of the existing contributions can be construed as direct tests of our model,
as fully convincing measure of distance, our crucial conceptual construct, have not yet been
developed. In additions, a proper test of some of our predictions would require non-monotonic
specications and group-level income data, while the literature so far has privileged liner
models and used average income across all groups. For these reasons, the bulk of this section is
taken up by Section 5.3, which complements the review of empirical literature with a number
of case studies. The role of these examples is to illustrate how the concept of ethnic distance,
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as well as other insights from the model, could potentially enhance our understanding of
variations in ethnic relations across countries and over time.
5.1 Passing and Detection
At least since Barths (1969) classic book social scientists have been aware of overwhelming
evidence that individuals change their ethnic a¢ liation in response to external circumstances.
An often-cited case of passing is represented by light-skinned African-Americans who passed
and lived on the other side[to use the language of the New York Times, 9/7/2003], albeit at
the cost of severing all ties with their families and childhood friends, as poignantly depicted
in Roth (2000).22 The porosity of ethnic boundaries is also evident in wide observed swings
in self-reported ethnic identication in censuses [Nagel (1995), for American Indians, Evans
et. al. (1993) for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, Lieberson and Waters (1993) for
Whites in the U.S.]. Jeganathan (1997) reports that Tamil families living near Colombo give
Sinhalese names to their children and teach them Sinhalese cultural practices to help them
escape identication in case of riots. We will discuss several further examples of passing
below.
A path breaking experimental study by Habyarimana et al. (2007) highlights the
porosity of ethnic boundaries as well as the potential for individuals to manipulate their
identity. The authors asked people from diverse ethnic groups in Uganda to view digital
images of other Ugandans and categorize them into the appropriate ethnic group. They
found that, for example, members of the largest ethnic group (the Baganda, which comprised
about 45 percent of the survey), correctly identied a Bagandan approximately 70 percent of
the time, and incorrectly identied a non-Bagandan as Bagandan approximately 20 percent
of the time. They also found that, given the right incentives, members of some groups can
send signals to members of other groups that fool them into mistakenly accepting them as
members of their own. Lastly, they found that the degree of ethnic identiability (or the
ability to pass oneself o¤ as a member of another ethnic group) varies across group pairs,
indicating that some bilateral cleavages are more porous than others.
5.2 Empirics of Ethnic Conict
Perhaps the most novel prediction of our theory is that ethnic conict will be more prevalent
the greater the distance among ethnic groups. Unfortunately systematic measures of ethnic
distance are not available, and indeed the construction of a proper dataset would require
repeating experiments such as the one in Habyarimana et al. (2007) in a large number of
22Joseph Roth is not the only novelist who saw the literary potentital of passing. Other examples include
V.S. Naipaul (India), Edwidge Danticat (Haiti), and Uwem Akpam (Nigeria).
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countries. However, building on work by Laitin (2000) and Fearon (2003), Desmet et al.
(forthcoming) and Esteban et al. (2010) have recently made some progress using measures
of linguistic distance. In particular, Desmet et al. (forthcoming) report that linguistic frac-
tionalization computed on the basis of language groups that have split a long time ago is a
signicant predictor of conict, while fractionalization among language groups that have split
more recently does not predict conict. This is consistent with our model, as the earlier in
time two languages have split the more di¤erent they are likely to be. Hence, fractionalization
based on earlier splits is a better measure of distance than fractionalization based on more
recent splits: in other words older language cleavages likely correspond to higher language
barriers that make assimilation and passing more arduous. Esteban et al. (2010) show that a
measure of polarization constructed using linguistic distances is a robust predictor of conict.
While they interpret linguistic distance as proxying for di¤erences in preferences, we think
that an equally likely interpretation is that linguistic distance directly measures (a dimension
of) the costs of passing among groups.23
As mentioned in Section 2, distance in space is another possible dimension of ethnic
distance in the sense of our model. If groups are spatially clustered, jobs, subsidies, and
other benets of being the dominant group can be e¤ectively targeted using geographic
criteria - and practices of this kind are abundantly documented (see, e.g., the Bates papers
mentioned in the literature review). Passing becomes correspondingly more costly, as it
requires moving to a di¤erent region of the country. Hence, our theory also has the implication
that geographically clustered and isolated ethnic groups are more likely to nd themselves
parties to conicts. Matuszeski and Schneider (2006) present evidence that geographical
clustering of ethnic groups is signicantly related to the incidence, duration, and severity of
civil war. Similarly, Cederman et al. (2009), Weidman (2009) and Weidman et al. (2010)
nd that groups that are more clustered, tend to live in mountainous areas (and are therefore
more costly to reach/move away from), and are further away from the national capital are
more likely to be in conict with the central government [see also Toft (2003) for similar
results].
Further progress on distance has also recently been made by Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2009), and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), who nd signicant e¤ects of genetic
distanceon international trade and per-capita income di¤erences, respectively. While genetic
distance is not the same thing as ethnic distance (most genetic di¤erences do not lead to visible
di¤erences), this is consistent with distance being an important aspect of ethnic relations.
Our model also has comparative static implications with respect to appropriable
23 It could also be that linguistic distance proxies for other types of distances, e.g. visible physical di¤erences.
This would still be consistent with our model.
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wealth, z. Dube and Vargas (2011), Besley and Persson (2011), and Lei and Michaels (2011)
nd that increases in the price of locally-abundant natural resources and discoveries of new
endowments foster conict. These results are consistent with our model if on average locali-
ties are on the upward-sloping segment of the predicted inverted-U relation between resources
and conict.24
We have also derived some predictions with respect to changes in relative group in-
comes, yA and yB. Increases in the income of the losing/exploited group (which becomes
more reluctant to pass) and declines in the income of the winning/dominant group (which
becomes less concern with the opportunity cost of conict) should increase conict. Unfortu-
nately the empirical literature has not heretofore investigated the e¤ect of di¤erential income
shocks by ethnic group. In general, positive average income shocks appear to reduce conict
[Miguel et al. (2004), Ciccone (2011), Dube and Vargas (2011)]. This nding is consistent
with our model if average income is more representative of the income of the dominant group,
as would tend to be the case when the dominant group is the more numerous one.
A nal set of predictions concerns initial relative group sizes, n, though these predic-
tions are complex.25 Much of the empirical literature on ethnic conict is concerned with
mapping di¤erent statistics from the size distribution of ethnic groups into probabilities of
conict [e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), Montalvo and Raynal-
Querol (2005), Cederman and Girardin (2007)]. On the whole, this literature suggests that
certain ethnic structures are more conducive to conict than others, though the statistics
used do not map easily into the predictions of the present model. The model does however
highlight one possible concern with this literature. These studies take the existing ethnic
structure of the population as exogenous. But our model predicts that relative group sizes
change in response to conict, so regressing conict outcomes on statistics that depend on
the size-distribution of groups is very close to getting the direction of causality wrong. The
exogenous variable in our model is the initial group size distribution, but this is not what
typical data sets measure.2627
24Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) nd that the probability of conict is inverted-U shaped in the fraction of
primary commodities in GDP. This result is highly consistent with our predictions but it is not based on an
empirical design suitable to identify causal e¤ect. Furthermore Fearon (2005) shows that the result is not
robust.
25 In the baseline model of exploitation conict is monotonically decreasing in the pre-conict size of the
strong group. However when the weaker group can also ght backthe incidence of conict may become U
shaped in the stronger groups size.
26See Ahlerup and Olsson (2011) for another model of endogenous ethnic structure formation, and Fletcher
and Iygun (2010) for empirical evidence that indeed ethnic structure is a function of past conict outcomes.
27Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2001b) show that feelings of ethnic identication and inter-ethnic hostility
intensify following conict. It is di¢ cult to intepret this result without distinguishing between those in the
group that came up on top or the group that lost ground in the conict. For those in the successful group we
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5.3 Historical Examples
5.3.1 Pigmentation
In the United States no other ethnic group stands out for its troubled relationships with the
white majority (and other groups, for that matter), and for its persistently disadvantaged
socioeconomic status, as the African-Americans. Our theory suggests this may in part be
due to the fact that African-Americans are also the ones who most stand out visually: they
are black,as opposed to white.Hence, the greatest amount of conict is associated with
the greatest ethnic distance, , as suggested by our theory.
Of course African-Americans come in di¤erent shades of black, so  varies within this
group as well. Consistent with our theory, an increasing body of work shows that light-skinned
African-Americans have persistently (i.e. from the pre-civil war era to the present day) had
better outcomes (nutrition, education, income, wealth) than darker-skinned ones [Bodenhorn
and Ruebeck (2007) survey this literature]. In a striking recent contribution, Goldsmith et al.
(2006) have shown that the light-skin premium is discontinuous: light-skin blacks have wages
that are essentially the same as whites (controlling for the usual demographic characteristics),
while medium and dark-skinned blacks have wages that are indistinguishable from each other
and signicantly below those of whites and light-skinned blacks. As the authors conclude,
this suggests that << Employers ... in many cases, ... believe they are hiring someone who
is just as white as they are themselves.>> (p. 245). Another striking nding by Gymah-
Brempong and Price (2006) is that blacks with darker hues receive longer prison sentences
than light-skin ones for the same crimes. A light-skin premium has also been documented
for Mexican-Americans [Murguia and Telles (1996), Mason (2004)].28
The black-white conict in America is particularly striking because there would have
been no shortage of alternative (or additional) minorities to discriminate and exploit: Irish,
Italians, Jews, Poles, and other migrant communities could have been equally attractive
objects. Why havent they been targeted in the way blacks have? According to our theory,
this is simply because continued exclusion of these white immigrants would have been too
costly to enforce given the close physical proximity, or low , with the Anglo elite. Had the
would denitely expect an intesication of ethnic identity as the returns from a clear ethnic identication have
gone up. If there are still members of the losing group after the concit, these are by construction individuals
who have failed to pass, and it is therefore not surprising that they will feel hostile to the other group.
28The other group that is both distant from the white majority and historically greatly exploited is of course
the Native Americans. As argued in Section 4, our model can explain both their tragic experience in the 19th
century, and their currently privileged status. Asians  another ethnically distant group  have also been
singled out, witness for example the detention camps during World War II. But their luckwas to arrive in
the US mostly during the industrialization phase, when the incentives for exploitation had already declined
considerably.
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latter tried to perpetuate such discrimination, there would now be many more Americans
with names like Coleman, and many fewer with names like Caselli, as the holder of the latter
would have switched in mass to the former. Hence, the Anglomajority refrained from a
systematic attempt to disenfranchise the white immigrants - who have therefore been able to
preserve their ancestral identity.29
It is not that these immigrant communities did not su¤er their own share of initial
discrimination and exploitation, but that the Anglos have backed o¤ fairly soon, say
within one or two generations. One or two generations is probably the time required for the
newcomers (i.e. their descendents) to learn the language well enough, and to overcome the
physical baggage of pre-migration malnutrition, that they would be able to disguise their
ancestry  if necessary. Of course in equilibrium this is not necessary. Also, it is not that
it would have been impossible for the Anglos to set up a vast bureaucracy keeping track
of everyones ancestry, but in the case of physically similar individuals it was evidently too
costly.30
It is now increasingly widely recognized that discrimination against blacks has been
slowly but steadily declining over the last century in the US. Over the same span of time,
the economy has undergone a huge structural transformation from largely agricultural to
industrial and then service-based. This transformation has meant that land and other natural-
resource rents have become an increasingly insignicant share of total income. In our model,
this is equivalent to a decline in z=y. Hence, the model does indeed provide a possible
interpretation for the gradual and ongoing phasing out of discrimination against blacks.
The South-African case presents of course many analogies with the US case, and
our model describes it even better, if one identies the dominant group as the one that has
greater total resources. While whites are a numerical minority in South-Africa, their per-
capita resources so dwarf those of the black majority that their repoweris greater. This
allowed them to establish the apartheid regime. The rich mineral resources of the country,
coupled with the small number of whites to divide them, provided the incentive. In other
words South Africa has historically been a high , low n, and high z=y country, making
it ideally suited for exploitation. Over time, as the economy grew and diversied away
from the primary sector, and the sanction regime against the white government became
increasingly aggressive, z=y fell, and the cost of maintaining the regime became too large
29Another distinguishing factor for blacks vis-a-vis other groups is that their ancestors came to the US as
slaves. But it is not entirely clear why, after the abolition of slavery, people of anglosaxon descent would want to
specically target descendants of slaves (rather than descendandants of voluntary immigrants) for exploitation
and discrimination. The evidence on light-skin premia discussed above also seem hard to reconcile with the
view that blacks are di¤erentially discriminated solely because of slavery.
30 Imagine enforcing a policy of separate water fountains for Italian-Americans!
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relative to the benets.31 The whites decided then to start a transition to the no conict
equilibrium. The model of Section 4 suggests that the nature of the apartheid regime may
have changed from by choiceto preemptivebefore further changes in the state variables
made it safe enough for the whites to relinquish power.
One could keep going with examples of conict or exploitation where di¤erences in
skin color plays a critical role in enabling members of one group to pinpoint members of
the other group. The Dominican police openly uses skin complexion and texture as a
criterion for identifying Haitians to be mass deported from the country.32 Humphreys
and ag Mohamed (2005) compare Southern Senegal and Northern Mali, and argue that in
the former ethnic tensions are much less severe than in the latter despite broadly similar
socioeconomic conditions  because in Mali the minorities (Tuareg and Maures) are more
readily physically distinguished from the majority than in Senegal (Diola).
5.3.2 Body size
The black-white gradient is of course an important physical source of ethnic distance, but
by no means the only one. An illustration of this is provided by the Rwandan case, where
so-called Hutusand Tutsishave been in extremely bloody if somewhat intermittent 
conict since the end of the colonial era. Much has been written about the articial birth
of the Hutu-Tutsi split as part of the divide-and-conquer strategy of Belgium, the colonial
power. For us, what is notable is the rich anecdotal evidence that physical attributes play
a critical role in the conict. On average, Tutsis are taller and more slender, they have
somewhat lighter skin, and thinner noses. Indeed, the Belgian colonists classied a person
as Tutsi if they had a long nose (or ten cows). During the genocidal campaign that led to
the death of more than one half of a million people in 1994, Hutus reportedly made use
of these visual cues to identify potential victims. This of course implies that many Hutus
were also victimized, as they did not t the stereotypical description (for example they were
too tall or too thin). To us, the willingness of the genocides perpetrators to commit such
type Ierrors strongly supports the group enforcinginterpretation of ethnic conict over
31Mineral Sales as a fraction of GDP for South Africa declined from 25 percent in 1980 to 11 percent in
1994 (the end of apartheid).
32According to Human Rights Watch (2002) the Dominican authorities have conducted mass expulsions of
Haitians and Dominico-Haitians. ... Snatched o¤ the street, dragged from their homes, or picked up from their
workplaces, Haitian-lookingpeople are rarely given a fair opportunity to challenge their expulsion during
these wholesale sweeps. Questioned by Human Rights Watch as to how undocumented Haitians are identied,
the subdirector for Haitian a¤airs of the Dominican governments migration department insisted that they
can be spotted ... Noting that Haitians also have rougher skin,the subdirector declared that theyre much
blacker than we are. Theyre easy to recognize. 
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explanations based on hatred or within-group altruism.33 To put it crudely, pre-genocide
Rwanda was a country on the verge of an impending famine, mainly due to excess population
pressure on the land. A genocide was one way to relieve such pressures, and targeting Tutsis,
or rather as it turned out the tall and thin, assured that the designated victims could not
inltrate the dominant group (i.e., in this case, escape the killers).34
The use of height in the Rwandan case raises the interesting question of why is height
not used more systematically around the world as a boundary-enforcing marker. In particular,
it would seem that in ethnically-homogeneous countries one should observe winning groups
of individuals below or above a certain height threshold. We speculate that the typical shape
of the height distribution makes it unsuitable to the purpose of boundary enforcement. In
particular, within ethnic groups (and gender) height distributions are known to be normal
(and thus are unimodal and with thin tails). This implies that any group boundary that
makes conict worthwhile must be drawn at a point which leaves large masses of people on
both of its sides. Because height is not easily measured perfectly, this means that the number
of type I and type II errors is vast, and the scheme may become unworkable.35
5.3.3 Religion
Religion is often cited as a conict-inducing cleavage, and indeed there appear to be some
fairly clear-cut historical cases where religion appears to have played a major role. The
e¤ectiveness of religion as a signpost for group boundaries will mostly depend on the size of the
psychic costs involved in conversion. In turn, such costs are likely to vary considerably across
religions, across pairs of religions (namely conversion to religion A may be psychologically
less costly than conversion into religion B, for someone originally raised in religion C), and
across people of the same original group. Such variation can be tremendous. On the one
hand, there are agents who are clearly willing to endure the utmost sacrices to stay true
33The killers also targeted so-called moderate Hutus, i.e. Hutus who did not cooperate in the genocide.
34The infamous Radio Mille Collines broadcast: Those of you who live along the road, jump on the people
with long noses, who are tall and slim, and want to dominate us. (Peterson, 2000, p. 327). Very similar
considerations, only in reverse, apply to Burundi, where the tall and thin Tutsis dominate the Hutus. There,
too, physical characteristics play an explicit role. For example, the army has a height-by-girthrequirement
that so happens to exclude from the ranks the average Hutu. And there, too, changing economic circumstances
a¤ect the incentive of the dominant group to tighten the exploitation equilibrium: when co¤ee prices (the
export crop) fall, the relative return to government jobs increase, and the Tutsis ght Hutu inltrationmore
ercely (Gurr, 2000).
35The (gender-specic) Rwandan height distribution is a mixture of the Tutsi distributuion and the Hutu
distribution, which have di¤erent means. Hence it is conceivable that the resulting overall distribution is
bimodal, and the valley between the two modes could conceivably be su¢ ciently deep such that drawing the
boundary near the trough minimizes the number of type I and type II errors. It is also important to remember
that height was only one of several physical markers used during the genocide.
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to their religious identity (after all, the word martyrwas originally introduced to describe
people who were willing to be eaten alive by wild animals for their faith!). On the other,
there is abundant anecdotal evidence which conrms that in at least some cases individuals
are able and willing to shed their religion to respond to external circumstances, particularly
discrimination against ones group. In post-Reform Europe entire populations switched back
and forth between Catholicism and Protestantism, as the political alliances of their princes
switched back and forth between the Pope, the Emperor, and other potentates.36 In Fascist
Italy many Jews converted to Catholicism to escape discrimination. In modern-day India
it is common for lower-caste Hindus to convert to the Muslim or Catholic faiths, which are
relatively less discriminated against.
In terms of our model, it is unlikely that we can ascribe the same value of  to
di¤erent religious-group pairings: some group pairs will perceive a high , leading to a higher
likelihood of conict, and others a lower , leading to broadly peaceful relations. It is therefore
unlikely that religious di¤erences will be found systematically to relate to conict. Indeed,
Alesina et al. (2003) nd that religious fractionalization does not signicantly predict the
rent-seeking policy distortions usually associated to other types of ethnic fractionalization.
Similarly, examining a large cross-section of conicts, Fox (1997) nds that in only a small
minority of these do religious issues play more than a marginal role.
Another implication of these considerations is that, while religion will sometimes
be the focal trigger for discrimination, physical di¤erences should be more systematically
related to conict than religious ones. A stark example of color working better than religion
as a group enforcing mechanism is recounted by Horowitz (1985, p.43): In seventeenth
century North-America, the English were originally called Christians, while the African
slaves were described as heathens. The initial di¤erentiation of groups relied heavily on
religion. After about 1680, however, a new dichotomy of whitesand blackssupplanted the
former Christian and heathen categories, for some slaves had become Christians. If reliance
had continued to be placed mainly on religion, baptism could have been employed to escape
from bondage. Color provided a barrier seemingly both visible and permanent. 37
5.3.4 Language
Another feature that may be used to discriminate among groups is language. Examples of
this go literally back to biblical times with tales of warring tribes using the pronunciation
of certain words to establish who should be slaughtered [Judges 12:4-6] and stretch to 21st
36And the so-called religious warswere mostly international wars that happened to involve the Papacy
as one of the territorial contenders.
37An argument could probably be made that a similar shift occurred at various times from religious to racial
anti-Semitism, for example after the expulsion of Jews from Spain.
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century Northern Ireland, where, as reported by The Economist of June 15th, 2002, a group
of masked men [entered a school and] demanded that students produce identication or repeat
the alphabet. Many Catholics pronounce the letter hdi¤erently to Protestants, with an
aspiration inuenced by the Irish language. Students were evacuated before it became clear
what was planned for people with the wrong accent.Another example is provided by the
1937 massacre of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, where victims were identied by their
inability to pronounce the word perejil (parsley) correctly[e.g. Danticat (1998), who also
highlights the occurrence of type I errors.]
5.3.5 No conict
So far our examples have involved cases of conict, and we have asked whether our model
can shed light on these episodes. In principle, we would like to o¤er examples were there
is no conict because there is insu¢ cient distance. A possible set of candidates is provided
by those resource-rich countries that have managed to avoid some of the most pernicious
political consequences of the windfall, such as Norway. Because of its rich oil reserves Norway
is probably a high z=y for the purposes of our model. While most countries with a high
share of natural resources in income seem to have fraught social relations and poor economic
outcomes, Norway has neither. Perhaps its high degree of ethnic homogeneity is the key to
this success. A similar example may be Botswana, where the physical similarity of di¤erent
groups is cited by Acemoglu et al. (2003) as a possible reason why conict over natural
resources has not erupted there.38 Such examples may be contrasted with, say, ethnically
fragmented Nigeria or Congo.
A more subtle example of ethnic proximity leading to relatively peaceful ethnic re-
lations may perhaps be found in the Indian case.39 In a world were all ethnic cleavages are
equally important, for a very poor, over-populated country such as India, the 13% Muslim mi-
nority should constitute an attractive target for massive exploitation, if not for Rwandan-style
elimination. Instead, Muslims have for the most part equal economic and political rights. Our
speculation is that India enjoys this relative harmony precisely because the ethnic distance
38The only shadow on Botswanas reputation as a model of ethnic harmony is cast by the advocacy group
Survival Internationals claim that the government is mistreating the San, a tribe of Bushmen. Surprise
surprise, the Pigmy-sized Bushmen have very high  vis-a-vis other Southern Africans.
39There seemingly is a lot of communal violence in India, so some readers may nd it paradoxical to treat
India as a case of relative ethnic harmony. The fact, is, however, that relative to the size of the population,
ethnic violence in India is actually fairly trivial. For example, Varshney (2002) estimates that between 1950
and 1995 there was a total of 7,173 deaths caused by communal rioting, which leads to an average of 155.9
deaths per year for those 46 years. In contrast, Pakistan seems to be engaged in repression of the Hindu
minority. Although objective evidence is di¢ cult to obtain, anecdotal evidence suggests that passing seems
to be taking place, especially in the form of switching last names from Hindu to Muslim.
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between Muslims and Hindus is quite modest: too oppressive an exploitation equilibrium
by the Hindu majority would be unsustainable in the face of mass ethnic switching by the
Muslims.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a simple theory of social distributive conict which emphasizes
the importance of the porosity of social-group boundaries. We have applied this theory to
developed a new, simple explanation for the salience of ethnicity in exploitation and conict
around the world. Ethnicity provides a technology for group membership and exclusion which
is used to avoid indiscriminate access to the spoils of conict. Without such a technology
groups become porous and the spoils of conict are dissipated. In relating the incidence of
ethnic conict to variables such as group size and the share of expropriable assets in overall
wealth, we were able to derive various implications that seem to shed light on a variety of
historical episodes of conict (and lack thereof).
It is natural to try to use the insights of the model to suggest policy recommendations
to minimize the incidence of conict along ethnic lines. The model suggests that economic
development alone will remove the incentives for ethnic conict, particularly if it is accompa-
nied, as it often is, by a structural transformation where control over natural (expropriable)
resources plays a smaller and smaller role The paper therefore adds to the list of good things
that come with growth, beyond higher consumption. It also o¤ers a foundation for the as-
sertion by Habyarimana, et. al., (2008) that modernization may be the antidote to ethnic
nationalism rather than its cause.
Secondly, the model of Section 4 suggests that ethnic conict is sometimes preemptive,
in that the stronger group preempts with conict to protect itself from aggression by a smaller
group. If the smaller group could commit to no conict, then the larger group would feel
no need for preemption. This is certainly not a paper about how to form institutions that
facilitate commitment, but it highlights the role of such institutions in avoiding conict.40
Perhaps most interestingly, the paper suggests that any policy that blurs sharp dis-
tinction between groups will reduce the incidence of ethnic conict. One such policy is the
promotion of intermarriage. Policies such as tax breaks for interracial couples (which may
increase with the number of children) and a¢ rmative action programs for mixed-race indi-
40Policies that increase transparency on the magnitude and destination of natural-resource export revenues,
such as the Extractive Industries Development Initiative (EITI), in which participating governments and oil
companies agree to disseminate detailed information on quantities extracted, revenues, and royalties paid to
the government, also nd support in our model. Likewise for certication processes that keep conict diamonds
out of rich-country markets, as was done for the ghting in Sierra Leone.
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viduals may help achieve such a goal. Policies to encourage interracial adoption could also be
justied along the lines of our model. The surest path to a world without racism is a world
without races.
Although we presented several historical examples of ethnic conict that are consistent
with the premise of this paper, there is a clear sense in which the data required to fully test
the implications of the model are not yet available. Our theory highlights the role of ethnic
distance in leading to ethnic conict: ceteris paribus, ethnic groups are more likely to
clash the more pronounced the di¤erences that mark the ethnic cleavage. Systematic data on
ethnic distance has not yet been collected. Extending the empirical results of Habyarimana,
et. al. (2007) for Uganda to many other countries would be a great start in this direction.
Given the importance of ethnic conict in the world, we hope that research such as ours
would motivate the collection of this type of data.
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